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Abstract. 
Almost all human infections by avian influenza viruses (AIVs) are transmitted from poultry. A systematic review 
was conducted to identify practices associated with human infections, their prevalence, and rationale. Observational 
studies were identified through database searches. Meta-analysis produced combined odds ratio estimates. The 
prevalence of practices and rationales for their adoptions were reported. Of the 48,217 records initially identified, 65 
articles were included. Direct and indirect exposures to poultry were associated with infection for all investigated 
viral subtypes and settings. For the most frequently reported practices, association with infection seemed stronger in 
markets than households, for sick and dead than healthy poultry, and for H7N9 than H5N1. Practices were often 
described in general terms and their frequency and intensity of contact were not provided. The prevalence of 
practices was highly variable across studies, and no studies comprehensively explored reasons behind the adoption 
of practices. Combining epidemiological and targeted anthropological studies would increase the spectrum and 
detail of practices that could be investigated and should aim to provide insights into the rationale(s) for their 
existence. A better understanding of these rationales may help to design more realistic and acceptable preventive 
public health measures and messages. 
INTRODUCTION 
All four of the influenza virus strains that resulted in pandemics in the last century have had 
an avian origin. While the 1918–1919 H1N1 pandemic strain was entirely derived from an avian 
virus,
1
 the subsequent pandemic strains of H2N2 in 1957, H3N2 in 1968, and H1N1 in 2009 all 
acquired gene segments from avian viruses by reassortment.
2,3
 Within the last 20 years, a variety 
of avian influenza virus (AIV) subtypes affecting domestic poultry—especially H5N1, H7N9, 
and H9N2—has resulted in human infections in mainly Asia and Egypt.4–6 Although these 
zoonotic transfers are sporadic and their transmission is not sustained within human populations, 
they also show a potential for reassortment with human viruses
7
; a very few nucleotide 
substitutions in some circulating strains might allow them to be transmissible between humans.
8
 
It is widely feared that ongoing circulation of zoonotic AIVs within poultry populations and their 
transfer to humans could result in emergence of a novel human pandemic strain. As almost all 
human cases result from exposure to poultry or to environments contaminated by poultry,
9–11
 
mitigation measures intended to prevent zoonotic infections and reduce the risk of adaptation of 
these viruses to human hosts must be carefully targeted, not only toward the poultry populations 
sustaining these viruses
12
 but also toward practices exposing people to infected poultry and 
contaminated environments. Mitigation measures have to take into account the complexity and 
difficulty of behavior change strategies and techniques, recognizing that ―behavior‖ should not 
be construed as exclusively ―individual‖ but as located within a socioeconomic and cultural 
milieu. 
This study presents a systematic review of the scientific literature relating to practices 
exposing humans to AIVs in Asia and Egypt. The objectives of the review are to identify poultry 
exposure practices associated with human infection, describe their prevalence within human 
populations, and examine the rationales for their persistence. This review is informed by insights 
from social anthropology. It recognizes that the analytical category ―practice(s)‖ as deployed in 
the literature reviewed largely ignores the social, economic, and cultural context(s) and the 
subjective meanings of such ―practices‖ for the ―practitioners.‖ 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Search strategy and selection criteria. 
This systematic review adheres to PRISMA guidelines (see checklist in Supplemental 
Material).
13
 A database search of MEDLINE, Science Citation Index, Social Science Citation 
Index, and The Zoological Record was conducted during the period October 10, 2014, to January 
12, 2015. The search used the Boolean search criteria ―A AND B‖, as follows: 
 
A: ―avian influenza‖ OR ―avian flu‖ OR ―bird flu‖ OR ―influenza A‖ OR ―H5N1‖ OR ―H7N7‖ OR ―H7N9‖ OR 
―H9N2‖ and 
B: ―animal-human‖ OR ―backyard farms‖ OR ―biosecurity‖ OR ―chicken farms‖ OR ―commercial farms‖ OR 
―cultural practices‖ OR ―disease transmission‖ OR ―duck farms‖ OR ―exposure‖ OR ―face masks‖ OR ―farms‖ OR 
―gloves‖ OR ―human exposure‖ OR ―human infection‖ OR ―live bird markets‖ OR ―live poultry markets‖ OR 
―market practices‖ OR ―markets‖ OR ―occupational exposure‖ OR ―poultry farms‖ OR ―prevention‖ OR ―risk‖ OR 
―risk + exposure‖ OR ―risk behavior‖ OR ―risk practices‖ OR ―seroconversion‖ OR ―seroprevalence‖ OR 
―transmission.‖ 
The ―Title‖, ―Keywords,‖ and ―Abstract‖ fields were selected in all databases, except for the 
MEDLINE database which offered to search ―All Fields.‖ EndNote was used to manage citations 
and remove duplicates. 
Eligible articles had to be published between January 1, 1997, and December 31, 2014. This 
review start date was chosen because the first H5N1 human case was reported during that year.
14
 
Articles had to either assess 1) the association between poultry exposure practices and clinical or 
asymptomatic infection by AIVs (hereafter referred to as risk factor studies) or 2) the prevalence 
of these practices in human populations (hereafter referred as practice prevalence studies). The 
poultry exposure practices under consideration had to result in physical contact with poultry or 
contact with environments potentially contaminated by poultry. Human infections with AIVs 
could be either clinical cases that were laboratory confirmed or seropositive, asymptomatic 
individuals. If the association between a practice and human infection was assessed, a measure of 
effect had to be reported. 
Practice prevalence studies included studies assessing proportions of individuals adopting 
defined practices in a given population, as well as studies only mentioning the presence or 
absence of defined practices in the study population. For both study types, searches were 
restricted to English-language publications and studies based in Asia and Egypt, where the 
subtypes currently causing most human cases (H5N1, H9N2, and H7N9) are endemic.
4–6
 In 
addition, we assessed all studies identified in the initial search if they explored the reasons why 
people adopt practices, which may promote human exposure to avian influenza, whether they 
gave quantitative information on risk factors for infection or prevalence of practices. 
Screening of titles and abstracts was carried out by one reviewer and checked by a second to 
remove studies unlikely to contain relevant information. Where exclusion could not be justified 
by one reviewer based solely on screening of a record’s title and abstract, the full text was 
retrieved to allow both reviewers to reach a consensus. 
Data analysis. 
The quality of included risk factor studies was assessed using an adaptation of the Cochrane 
Risk of Bias Tool.
15
 Risk of bias was assessed for the following domains: bias due to 
confounding, bias in the selection of participants into the study, bias in measurement of 
exposures, bias due to missing data and bias in measurement of outcome. Based on these 
domain-level assessments, the overall risk of bias of each study was assessed as low, moderate, 
serious, or critical (Supplemental Text 1, Supplemental Table 1). The quality of the practice 
prevalence studies was based on the rigor of the sampling strategy and the representativeness of 
the findings either at the province or country level. To be classified as Quality 1, participants had 
to be recruited using random sampling at the provincial (first administrative division) or national 
level. If sampling was not random (e.g., purposive and convenience) and/or the study was 
conducted at the level of a district (second administrative division) or lower, the study was 
classified as Quality 2. 
For all studies, the following variables were extracted: study period, location, study design, 
study population, sample size, setting (household, live bird market [LBM], and farm). For risk 
factor studies, the following variables were also extracted: case definitions, poultry exposure 
practices measured, and their associated non-adjusted and adjusted measure of association with 
outcomes (e.g., odds ratio [OR]) along with their 95% confidence interval (CI) and P value. For 
practices that were investigated in two or more studies, we examined heterogeneity between 




 and computed overall OR estimates using the random-effect model 
of DerSimonian and Laird.
17
 As adjusted ORs were not reported in all studies, ORs that were not 
adjusted for other exposures were used as model inputs. A sensitivity analysis was conducted by 
differentiating studies according to their risk of bias and locations (Supplemental Text 2, 
Supplemental Tables 2 and 3). 
For the practice prevalence studies, we focused on those practices identified a priori to be 
associated with human infection. For each practice, the proportion of people or households 
adopting it was extracted, along with the associated CI. When the CI of a proportion was not 
mentioned in a paper, the binomial proportion CI (also referred to as the exact method) was 
calculated. These practices included raising poultry at home, keeping birds inside the house, 
visiting LBMs, touching poultry during purchase, handling (touching, selling, throwing, and 
incinerating) or eating sick or dead poultry, slaughtering poultry, and using personal protective 
equipment (PPE). We did not aim to compute overall estimates for the prevalence of each 
practice, but rather to describe variations in prevalence estimates for given practices across 
settings and studies. The range and median of reported prevalences and I
2
 statistic were reported. 
If some practice prevalence studies explored reasons why people adopted some of the practices 
of interest based on responses to interviews and observations, these rationales were extracted. 
Data were extracted by a first reviewer and then checked for missing data and inaccuracies by a 
second reviewer. A sensitivity analysis was conducted by differentiating studies according to 
their geographical location and their quality score (Supplemental Text 2, Supplemental Tables 4 
and 5). 
All analyses were run using R 3.2.2
18
 and the package ―metafor‖.19 
Roles of the funding source. 
The funders of the study had no role in study design, data collection, data analysis, data 
interpretation, or writing of the report. The corresponding author had full access to all the data in 
the study and had final responsibility for the decision to submit for publication. 
RESULTS 
Study selection and characteristics. 
In total, 547 full texts were screened. Of these, 65 articles were included in the systematic 
review (Figure 1). Some articles reported multiple studies conducted in different countries over 
different years, targeting different populations (e.g., households and market workers) or focusing 
on different virus subtypes, and exploring both the presence of risk factors and the prevalence of 
practices. They were considered as separate studies. Twenty-three articles incorporated 24 risk 
factor studies (Table 1) and 46 articles presented 51 practice prevalence studies (Supplemental 
Table 8). 
Twenty of the 24 risk factor studies investigated either H5N1 (N = 11) or H7N9 (N = 9) 
infections. Three studies detected H9 and one detected H7. Cases were defined as patients with a 
clinically apparent infection—as opposed to asymptomatic infection—in half of H5N1 studies 
and in all but one H7N9 studies. Most studies had either a case–control (N = 10) or a cross-
sectional (N = 8) study design. Four out of the five ecological studies focused on H7N9, and 
there was only one cohort study. Half of the H5N1 studies and all H7N9 studies were conducted 
in China (including Hong Kong). Other study sites were Cambodia, Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan, 
Thailand, and Vietnam. Six studies focused on workers in commercial poultry farms (as opposed 
to household flocks), markets, and/or abattoirs. The other 18 studies recruited participants from 
the general or rural populations. The number of cases in the 10 case–control studies ranged from 
7 to 89, with a median of 27. In seven of the eight cross-sectional studies, the prevalence of 
infection was lower than 6%. The quality assessment of these studies is detailed in Supplemental 
text 1. Ten studies were assessed as being at moderate risk of bias and 14 at serious risk of bias. 
All 51 practice prevalence studies were cross-sectional and conducted in 14 countries, mostly 
in southeast Asia (N = 25, 49%) and China (N = 11, 22%, including Hong Kong). Thirty-six 
studies explored poultry exposure practices in households, whereas practices adopted by poultry 
market, farm, and/or abattoir workers were explored in 15 studies. All but three studies explored 
practices using standardized questionnaires. The remaining three studies, conducted in 
Bangladesh, used observations and in-depth interviews. Sample sizes were highly variable, 
ranging from 34 to 4950, with a median of 312. We classified 21 studies as Quality 1 and 30 
studies as Quality 2 (Supplemental Table 8). 
Association between poultry exposure practices and AIV infection. 
Study-specific and pooled ORs for each poultry exposure practice explored in the included 
case–control, cohort, and cross-sectional studies are shown in Figures 2–5 (detailed exposures in 
Supplemental Table 12). 
Indirect exposure. 
Indirect exposure to poultry was generally expressed as the co-occurrence of poultry and 
study participants in a given environment: within the neighborhood, at home, in a LBM, or at the 
worksite. Poultry could be described as healthy, sick, or dead. The evidence for an association 
between infection and presence of poultry in backyard or commercial farms in the vicinity of 
study participants’ homes was variable across studies (Figure 2). Meta-analysis results suggested 
that the presence of poultry at home substantially increased the odds of infection by H5N1 
(pooled OR = 3, 95% CI = 1.7–5.5) and H7N9 (pooled OR = 3.6, 95% CI = 1.4–8.9). 
Heterogeneity was, however, large among H7N9 studies (I
2
 = 69%). Odds of infection were even 
further increased if poultry raised at home became sick or died (H5N1, pooled OR = 9.5, 95% CI 
= 5.1–17.8). 
Occupational exposure to poultry was explored in only three studies, of which two suggested 
an association with human infection.
21,26
 Visits to LBMs were associated with infection in all 
studies reporting such exposure. The pooled OR estimate for H7N9 infection was 5.2 (95% CI = 
3.6–7.3) and for H5N1 3.5 (95% CI = 1.7–7). These results were in agreement with ecological 
study findings (Supplemental Table 6). H5N1 infection in Indonesia was associated with the 
occurrence of poultry outbreaks in the same area (RR = 1.3, 95% CI = 1.1–17).24 Two studies 
found an association between H7N9 cases and the density of LBMs,
36,37
 whereas two others 
noted a drastic reduction in H7N9 incidence with LBM closure.
35,38
 
Increase in the odds of infection with the proximity between poultry and humans, the size of 
the susceptible poultry population, and the frequency of exposure was further suggested through 
the exploration of additional variables (Supplemental Table 7). Keeping poultry cages inside 
rather than outside the home
21




 flocks with 
suboptimal vaccination coverage
21
 increased the odds of infection. 
In three studies, ORs were shown to increase with the frequency of visits to LBMs.
21,31,34
 The 
effect of occupational exposure was found to further vary with premise type: breeder and layer 
farms were at higher risk for their employees than other farm types in two studies,
40,41
 whereas 
working in retail markets was riskier than in wholesale markets and farms in another study.
26
 
Regarding poultry species, there was weak evidence in one study that the OR of H5N1 
infection was higher when raising waterfowl at home than when raising chickens only.
21
 In one 
study, exposure to geese and turkeys, respectively, increased the odds of H5N1 infection, 
whereas exposure to ducks increased the odds of H9 infection.
30
 However, the odds of H9 
infection were not different as between duck and chicken keepers in another study
42
 
(Supplemental Table 7). 
Only seven out of the 19 case–control, cohort, and cross-sectional studies described specific 
activities leading to indirect exposures. Most studies found weak evidence of association 
between infection and poultry husbandry-related activities (Figure 3). Feeding poultry in farms, 
witnessing poultry slaughter in markets, and storing products from sick/dead poultry at home 
were found to be associated with H5N1 infection, each of them in one study. Some investigated 
activities were unrelated to poultry management but to contact with water potentially 
contaminated by poultry. Although pooled OR estimates revealed weak evidence of an 
association between H5N1 infection and the use of outdoor water (pooled OR = 2.5, 95% CI = 
0.5–12.1), the evidence was stronger for bathing in water bodies (pooled OR = 3.1, 95% CI = 
1.5–6.4). 
Direct exposure. 
As with indirect exposure, direct exposure to poultry was often described in general terms as 
direct contact with, touching or handling poultry. Meta-analysis suggested an association 
between handling poultry and infection (Figure 4). Heterogeneity was high among studies and 
could not only be explained by the diversity of settings, as the level of heterogeneity was not 
reduced when only considering households (Supplemental Table 3). This association seemed 
slightly stronger for H7N9 (pooled OR = 5.5, 95% CI = 2.3–13.1) than H5N1 (pooled OR = 2.8, 
95% CI = 1.1–7.4), and when sick or dead poultry were concerned (H5N1, pooled OR = 4.8, 
95% CI = 1.2–19.2). However, handling poultry did not seem to result in higher odds of 
infection than indirect exposure at home or in markets. 
The investigated activities resulting in direct exposure to poultry were related to poultry 
husbandry, processing, and consumption (Figure 4). While consumption of healthy-appearing or 
sick poultry was not associated with H5N1 or H7N9 infection, several stages of poultry 
processing—such as slaughtering, evisceration, and preparation—were found in the meta-
analysis to increase the odds of H5N1 infection. Regarding poultry husbandry practices, 
vaccinating and handling birds to place them into cages were found associated with H9 and 
H5N1 infection in two different studies. Although a study found weak evidence for higher odds 
of H9 infection among chicken butchers than keepers (OR = 3.4, 95% CI: 0.8–14.5),42 the small 
number of studies for each processing and husbandry activity, and the often high level of 
heterogeneity among them limit the comparisons that can be performed across activities, viral 
subtypes and poultry health status. 
Protective factors. 
Regarding hygiene practices (Figure 5), meta-analysis provided weak evidence for frequent 
handwashing being a protective factor (H5N1 pooled OR = 0.5, 95% CI = 0.2–1.3; H7N9 pooled 
OR = 0.2, 95% CI = 0–1.2). Only one study examined use of masks and frequent disinfection of 
worksites (e.g., farms). It noted a reduced odds of infection (ORs = 0.1, 95% CI = 0–1 and ORs 
= 0.1, 95% CI = 0–0.6, respectively).41 
Prevalence of poultry exposure practices. 
Exposure to live birds was widespread in studied populations. Although the proportion of 
households raising backyard poultry was higher in rural than in peri-urban and urban areas, 
purchasing live poultry in markets was more frequent in peri-urban and urban rather than rural 
settings (Table 2, Supplemental Figures 1 and 2). Levels of contact with poultry at markets and 
households greatly varied across studies: the proportion of households keeping poultry inside 
their own house ranged from 1% to 87% (Table 2), and the proportion of households 
slaughtering birds at home ranged from 12% to 85% (Table 3, Supplemental Figure 3). The 
proportion of respondents who reported touching poultry when purchasing it in markets was 
lower than 18% in the three surveys conducted in Hong Kong, whereas it was higher than 58% in 
five of six surveys conducted in mainland China, Viet Nam, and Thailand (Supplemental Figure 
2). 
The surveyed populations were highly heterogeneous in terms of their management of sick 
and dead poultry (Table 3). In Bangladesh, Egypt and, to a lesser extent, Cambodia, the 
proportion of survey participants burying or incinerating dead poultry was generally lower and 
the proportion consuming, selling, or throwing sick or dead poultry into open spaces was 
generally higher when compared with other study sites (including China, India, Indonesia, Lao, 
Thailand, and Viet Nam) (Supplemental Figure 4). 
The proportion of household survey participants reporting handwashing with soap after 
contact with poultry was higher than 80% in all studies exploring this practice, except in one 
study in Bangladesh where the proportion dropped to 4%. The adoption of PPE was higher 
among farm and market workers than in households. However, most workers generally reported 
not wearing PPE (Supplemental Figure 5). 
Some additional practices were reported by only a couple of studies, including practices 
exposing humans to potentially contaminated environments. This included cleaning places where 
poultry are kept, bathing in water bodies in Cambodia, washing carcasses in water bodies in 
Cambodia and Bangladesh, and barefoot contact with blood in Bangladesh. 
Rationale for poultry exposure practices. 
None of the reviewed studies sought to explore the rationales behind practices at risk of 
human exposure to AIVs. Eight practice prevalence studies did address some of the reasons for 
conducting some practices, but not comprehensively (Supplemental Table 10). Other studies 
discussed these rationales as post hoc hypotheses (Supplemental Table 11). However, exploring 
rationales requires targeted research and in none of the papers were these dealt with according to 
the canons of social anthropology and ethnography. 
The eight prevalence studies, in which reasons for some practices were briefly discussed, 
took place in Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Lao, and Turkey. In Bangladesh, backyard farmers 
reported keeping poultry in their bedroom because they are concerned about predation and 
thieves.
43
 Some kept sick poultry in their bedroom to separate them from their healthy poultry 
and to keep them under observation.
44
 This practice was related to the perception that people are 
not at risk of illness. Some people may have been aware of avian influenza, but they considered 
the risks associated with poultry handling as negligible. Moreover, several practices were 
described by the authors as a matter of preference, rooted in tradition (based on interviews of 
residents or developed as post hoc hypotheses).
45
 For instance, live poultry bought in markets 
were preferred to chilled or frozen meat for consumption as the latter was considered to be of 
lower quality.
46
 Poultry slaughtered immediately before cooking were traditionally believed to be 
fresher, more flavorsome and nutritious, and less likely to be contaminated.
47
 Likewise, reasons 
for touching poultry before buying were related to consumer traditions, relying on their own 
judgment of the quality and safety of the poultry.
47
 Authors also related the adoption of certain 
risky practices to poverty. High poultry prices meant that purchasing poultry meat was not 




The non-adoption of preventive measures was mainly explained by authors by financial 
constraints, such as implementation costs and potential impact on business, absence of 
supporting legislation, time and space constraints, and ―risk fatigue‖ from repeated 
outbreaks.
45,49–52
 This is generally analyzed in the context of poor populations that do not 
consider avian influenza to be a major health threat, and for whom the perceived chance of an 
adverse outcome from poultry exposure is considered to be relatively low compared with the 
adverse outcome of worsening poverty. 
Heterogeneity in practices across settings was often explained by authors by differing 
religious beliefs. In Bangladesh, sick poultry were slaughtered and consumed if it was thought 
that they were about to die because of religious bans on eating animals that die of natural 
causes.
44,48
 In contrast, consumption of dead poultry was reported in non-Muslim populations. 
According to Buddhist principles, killing is considered to have karmic consequences. Thai 




Both direct and indirect exposures to poultry in households, farms, or markets were 
associated with human infection by AIVs in most of the reviewed risk factor studies. The 
strength of this association seemed stronger for H7N9 than for H5N1, for sick and dead 
compared with healthy poultry, and in markets compared with any other setting. Several studies 
also suggested that the odds of infection further increased with the proximity between humans 
and poultry, the size of the poultry population to which humans were exposed, and the frequency 
of exposure. Direct exposure was not associated with higher odds of infection than indirect 
exposure. This apparent association between AIV infection and indirect exposure to poultry, and 
the possible role of handwashing and environmental disinfection as protective factors suggest 
that contacts with contaminated environments followed by ingestion, intranasal or conjunctival 
self-inoculation of the virus may be a major mode of AIV transmission. Infected poultry shed a 
high viral load, which may survive in the environment for a few days under favorable 
conditions.
53
 In households, virus survival in the environment may represent an infection 
pressure to which people may have prolonged contact, in particular when poultry are kept inside 
home, including in bedrooms. Even when environmental exposure is of a shorter duration, such 
as in the case of people visiting markets, the frequent introduction of infected poultry in markets 
and the associated viral circulation among marketed poultry
54
 means that humans may be 
exposed to high virus loads. However, high uncertainty remains regarding the actual modes of 
transmission involved. Contributions of aerosols and large droplets cannot be ruled out, as 
investigated exposures may be associated with several modes of transmission.
55
 H5N1 was 
shown to be transmitted between poultry by aerosols.
56
 Some practices, such as mechanical 
defeathering, may generate contaminated aerosols and large droplets, and result in the infection 
of people visiting markets.
57
 These results suggest that interventions aiming to reduce virus load 
in markets,
58
 and behavioral change strategies leading to higher biosafety standards when 
handling poultry, especially sick or dead specimens, could substantially reduce human exposure 
to AIVs. The adoption of risky and protective practices varied greatly across studies, and was 
frequently explained as motivated by financial constraints and religious beliefs. These variations 
could also result from temporal changes in people’s perception of their risk of infection. As these 
factors were expected to vary across the heterogeneous socioeconomic and cultural landscape 
covered by the reviewed articles, risk mitigation interventions should be tailored to these local 
contexts. However, none of the studies reviewed here aimed to assess the rationale behind 
practices at risk of human exposure to AIVs. Reviewed knowledge, attitude, and practice studies 
investigated questions related to awareness and knowledge, and a few studies did touch on some 
reasons behind specific practices and discussed these as post hoc hypotheses, but neither in 
sufficient detail nor at the appropriate level of conceptualization. 
LIMITATIONS 
Our review was exposed to recall bias, as exposures were captured in all risk factor studies, 
and most practice prevalence studies, through structured interviews of study participants, or 
proxies when study participants have died. Bias in the measurement of exposures was more 
pronounced in risk factor studies using serology to define prevalent cases: AIVs being endemic 
in most settings, there was uncertainty about whether the reported exposures preceded, or not, 
the infection. However, this bias might be limited as most investigated exposures were daily, 
routine practices, which might not greatly change in the medium-term in AIV-endemic settings. 
The use of structured interviews to measure exposure in all risk factor studies and most 
practice prevalence studies implied further limitations. Although the observed heterogeneity in 
the prevalence of practices was generally explained, as mentioned earlier, by variations in 
socioeconomic and cultural landscapes, this pattern could also result from the limited 
representativeness induced by the geographically small study sites, and response bias. Asking 
about past behavior or about practices that may be officially banned or enforced by regulation, or 
of which their adoption may be positively or negatively perceived by people may in addition 
result in biased answers, leading to an underestimation of the real levels of exposure. For 
instance, high compliance to handwashing was reported in all questionnaire surveys that 
investigated this practice, but it was only actually done by a small proportion of participants 
observed in one study.
48
 Moreover, structured questionnaire surveys can only investigate the 
adoption of practices of which the study designers have an awareness. For instance, several 
practice prevalence studies explored whether participants wear boots dedicated to the care of 
poultry. Based on observations of poultry rearing by Bangladeshi rural communities, one study 
was able to identify that people stepped barefoot into poultry blood.
43
 Stepping barefoot in 
poultry blood might be a more relevant practice than the failure to wear special boots dedicated 
to poultry care. 
The pooled OR estimates often relied on a small number of heterogeneous studies, and, 
therefore, need to be interpreted with caution. Also, terms used to refer to practices were often 
only merely named or briefly described. The same term could have different uses, and therefore, 
different meanings across studies. Multiple specific practices may have been encompassed 
within these descriptions. Only a few specific practices were investigated, but the frequency and 
intensity of contact were not detailed, preventing further discrimination of practices according to 
the degree of exposure to poultry. Overall, investigated practices—or their descriptions in the 
literature which are not the same as the practices themselves—appear not to have changed 
significantly within the last 17 years. Investigations have yet to be comprehensive, in-depth 
analyses of given and related practices. For example, while visiting live bird markets was found 
to be a risk factor for AIV infection in the first risk factor study in 1997, subsequent studies were 
rarely able to explore in more detail which types of practices within markets could lead to 
infection, given the retrospective nature of outbreak investigations. 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
To address these limitations, epidemiological surveys could benefit from being combined 
with anthropological investigations. Anthropological studies may help to identify practices that 
would be better described with observations and in-depth interviews to develop a more accurate 
and detailed understanding. Such practices may, for instance, include handwashing and the use 
of PPEs. Moreover, the development of structured interview protocols would greatly benefit 
from a prior anthropological exploration of both the conceptualization of ―practices‖ and of 
practices of interest. Whether ―practices‖ are of interest may alter in the light of more detailed 
description and contextualization. Practices that are not systematically investigated, but which 
may reveal to be of epidemiological importance, may thus be characterized. Further description 
of practices could include a characterization of the contacts involved, and a measure of their 
intensity and frequency. The more detailed and grounded into the local contexts these 
descriptions are, the less comparable they may be across settings characterized by heterogeneous 
populations. On the other hand, the more general these descriptions are, the less likely it would 
be possible to tailor interventions to the local contexts that shape those practices. Detailed 
descriptions are required to identify the most relevant practices and populations at risk that 
should be targeted by risk mitigation strategies. Nevertheless, the small number of cases 
identified in most risk factor studies may limit the exploration of the association between AIV 
infection and specific, detailed practices. If these practices were only adopted by a small fraction 
of the population, the statistical power would be low, and even if the actual association with AIV 
infection was strong, the measured strength of association would be uncertain. 
Epidemiological studies typically investigate the most significant causal relationships 
between practices and the human exposure to AIVs as part of outbreak investigations and 
interventions to control them. Although causal relationships are difficult to identify, they 
nevertheless seek to achieve this by examining associations between an exposure variable and a 
health outcome.
59,60
 However, identifying the specific practices promoting AIV transmission to 
humans is often not enough to improve preventive public health interventions and messages. For 
these messages to be heard and strategies to be adhered to by populations at risk, their design 
needs to be informed by a thorough understanding of the factors and theories influencing 
persistence of risky or preventive practices. Of use in such investigations is the rationale behind 
certain risky practices for exposure to disease: Why do people do what they do? Under which 
circumstances do they engage in risky practices? At what point do practices become habitual 
behavior as opposed to a conscious decision in light of the level of risk of pathogen 
transmission? How do these practices relate to the tradition, culture, and socioeconomic 
circumstances? How are these practices influenced by disease awareness and knowledge? These 
questions were not part of the main objectives of reviewed studies. Contextual research appeared 
to be merely a by-product. As mentioned earlier, practices and their rationales were often only 
briefly described. These ―descriptions‖ may on closer examination, and informed by 
ethnographic studies, turn out to have been dealing in homogenizing ―labels‖ rather than in 
―heterogenizing‖ ―descriptions.‖ This is important because terms such as ―fresh,‖ ―nutritious,‖ 
―quality,‖ and ―wholesome‖, are each supported by an implicit local ―theory‖ of these things, 
their importance and significance. Understanding these theories would help to tailor 
interventions to local circumstances (which may vary within countries), increasing their 
acceptance in populations at risk. A challenge to achieve this is to access the relation between 
individual actions and the socioeconomic and cultural environment in which those actions are 
situated and produced. Recent theoretical
61,62
 and empirical works explored the use of emergent 
properties, such as ―hope‖ or ―disgust,‖ as quantitative variables capturing people’s experiences 
of the social, economic, and cultural world they inhabit. In Uganda, the level of hope that a 
person experienced was measured and found to be associated with some known risk factors for 
HIV infection.
63
 In India, disgust was associated with handwashing behavior.
64
 Applying this 
approach may provide new insights about practice adoption and inform the development of 
preventive public health messages. Such messages would aim to alter the level of a given 
emergent property (e.g., ―hope‖ and ―disgust‖) in the targeted population to promote the uptake 
of protective practices. 
In conclusion, the descriptions of practices exposing humans to poultry and their shared 
environment are often general and with little information to aid understanding of underlying 
rationales, limiting their usefulness for developing effective control and preventive measures. 
The assessment of the prevalence of reported practices in populations at risk was also prone to 
biases acting to underestimate the actual level of exposure. Epidemiological surveys aiming to 
explore potentially infectious contacts at the human–animal interface would greatly benefit from 
being combined with anthropological investigations. Such an approach would not only allow a 
more accurate identification and detailed description of risky as well as preventive practices, but 
would also allow the exploration of the reasons behind these practices. This would in turn 
facilitate the development of preventive public health measures and messages more likely to lead 
to positive behavior change in targeted populations. 
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FIGURE 1. Flow of selected studies. 
 
 
FIGURE 2. Association between human AIV infection and indirect exposure to poultry in various locations. HH = 
Household; NS = not specified; Prem = premises, include farms, markets and abattoirs; non-adj OR = odds ratio is 
not adjusted for other exposure practices; adj OR = odds ratio is adjusted for other exposure practices; not reported = 
multivariate analysis was conducted but adjusted OR was not reported for the practice of interest. This figure 
appears in color at www.ajtmh.org. 
 
 
FIGURE 3. Association between human AIV infection and practices resulting in indirect exposure. HH = household; 
NS = not specified; Prem = premises, include farms, markets and abattoirs; non-adj OR = odds ratio is not adjusted 
for other exposure practices; adj OR = odds ratio is adjusted for other exposure practices; not reported = multivariate 




FIGURE 4. Association between human AIV infection and practices resulting in direct exposure. HH = household; 
NS = not specified; Prem = premises, include farms, markets and abattoirs; non-adj OR = odds ratio is not adjusted 
for other exposure practices; adj OR = odds ratio is adjusted for other exposure practices; not reported = multivariate 




FIGURE 5. Association between human AIV infection and preventive practices. HH =  household; NS = not 
specified; Prem = premises, include farms, markets and abattoirs; non-adj OR = odds ratio is not adjusted for other 
exposure practices; adj OR = odds ratio is adjusted for other exposure practices; not reported = multivariate analysis 
was conducted but adjusted OR was not reported for the practice of interest. This figure appears in color at 
www.ajtmh.org. 
TABLE 1 
Characteristics of studies exploring risk or protective factors for avian influenza virus infection in humans 
Reference Location Year(s) Design Study population and selection criteria N (cases) Case definition 
      Incident cases of laboratory confirmed H5N1 clinical infection 
Mounts and others20 China (HK) 1997 CC H5N1 clinical cases, controls matched by age, sex, location 56 (15) H5N1 clinical infection: respiratory illness and either a viral culture or a 4-fold rise in Ab titer 
Zhou and others21 China 2005–2008 CC H5N1 clinical cases, controls matched by age, sex, location 162 (28) H5N1 clinical infection: respiratory illness and either a viral culture, a 4-fold rise in Ab titer or a RT-PCR 
Areechokchai and others22 Thailand 2004 CC H5N1 clinical cases, controls matched by age, location 80 (16) H5N1 clinical infection: respiratory illness and viral culture or a RT-PCR 
Dinh and others23 Vietnam 2004 CC H5N1 clinical cases, controls matched by age, sex, location 134 (28) H5N1 clinical infection: respiratory illness and a RT-PCR 
Yupiana and others24 Indonesia 2005–2008 E H5N1 clinical cases 34 (34) 
H5N1 clinical infection: respiratory illness and either a viral culture, a 4-fold rise in Ab titer, a RT-PCR or 
MN Ab titer  1:80 and another serological test 
      Prevalent cases of laboratory confirmed H5N1 asymptomatic infection 
Vong and others25 Cambodia 2006 CC 
H5N1 seropositive rural residents, controls matched by age, sex, 
location and H5N1 poultry flock status 
31 (7) H5N1 seropositive: MN Ab titer  1:80 and Western blot 
Bridges and others26 China (HK) 1997–1998 CC Poultry workers 1312 (81) H5N1 seropositive: MN Ab titer  1:80 and Western blot 
Cavailler and others27 Cambodia 2007 CS Rural residents 700 (18) H5N1 seropositive: MN Ab titer  1:80 and HI Ab titer  1:160 
Huo and others28 China 2010 CS Residents raising poultry nearby lakes with wildfowl 306 (8) H5N1 seropositive: HI Ab titer  1:160 
Li and others29 China 2010–2012 CS Poultry workers 1169 (55) H5N1 seropositive: HI Ab titer  1:160 and MN 
Gomaa and others30 Egypt 2010–2011 CS Rural residents 708 (15) H5N1 seropositive: MN Ab titer  1:80 and HI test 
      Incident cases of laboratory confirmed H7N9 clinical infection 
Li and others31 China 2013 CC H7N9 clinical cases, controls matched by age, sex, location 100 (25) H7N9 clinical infection: respiratory illness and either a viral culture, a 4-fold rise in Ab titer or a RT-PCR 
Liu and others32 China 2013 CC H7N9 clinical cases, controls matched by age, sex, location 429 (89) H7N9 clinical infection: respiratory illness and either a viral culture, a 4-fold rise in Ab titer or a RT-PCR 
He and others33 China 2013 CC H7N9 clinical cases, controls matched by age, sex, location 258 (43) H7N9 clinical infection: respiratory illness and either a viral culture, a 4-fold rise in Ab titer or a RT-PCR 
Ai and others34 China 2013 CC H7N9 clinical cases, controls matched by age, sex, location 118 (25) H7N9 clinical infection: respiratory illness and a RT-PCR 
Yu and others35 China 2013 E H7N9 clinical cases 60 (60) 
H7N9 clinical infection: respiratory illness and either a viral culture, a 4-fold rise in Ab titer or a RT-PCR. 
Eighteen rural cases, two cluster cases and four mild cases were excluded. 
Fang and others36 China 2013 E H7N9 clinical cases 113 (113) H7N9 clinical infection: respiratory illness and either a viral culture, a 4-fold rise in Ab titer or a RT-PCR 
Fuller (2014)37 China 2013 E Individuals with respiratory illness tested for H7N9 NS H7N9 clinical infection: respiratory illness and either a viral culture, or a RT-PCR 
Wu and others38 China 2013–2014 E H7N9 clinical cases 182 (182) H7N9 clinical infection: respiratory illness and either a viral culture, a 4-fold rise in Ab titer, or a RT-PCR 
      Incident cases of laboratory confirmed H7N9 asymptomatic infection 
Wang and others39 China 2013 C Poultry market workers in districts with H7N9-infected market 96 (52) H7N9 seroconversion: HI Ab titer  1:40 in December, and a  4-fold rise from May to December. 
      Prevalent cases of laboratory confirmed H7 asymptomatic infection 
Ahad and others40 Pakistan 2010–2011 CS Chicken farm workers 354 (120) H7 seropositive: HI Ab titer  1:160 
      Prevalent cases of laboratory confirmed H9 asymptomatic infection 
Yang and others41 China 2011 CS Duck farm workers 1741 (12) H9 seropositive: HI Ab titer  1:40 
Yu and others42 China 2009–2010 CS Poultry farm and abattoir workers 305 (14) H9 seropositive: 2 MN Ab titer  1:80 
Gomaa and others30 Egypt 2010–2011 CS Rural residents 648 (38) H9 seropositive: MN Ab titer  1:80 
Ab titer = antibody titer; C = cohort; CC = case–control; CS = cross-sectional; E = ecological; HI = hemagglutination inhibition; HK = Hong Kong; MN = 





Prevalence of practices related to backyard poultry rearing and purchase of poultry in LBMs 
 
All households Urban households Peri-urban households Rural households 
n (c) p (range) I
2
 n (c) p (range) I
2
 n (c) p (range) I
2
 n (c) p (range) I
2
 
Raise backyard poultry 24 (10) 65 (19–96) 99 4 (3) 45 (19–51) 98 3 (2) 50 (34–55) 91 15 (9) 78 (50–96) 98 
Keep poultry inside house 6 (4) 20 (1–87) 100 
         Visit LBMs to purchase poultry 11 (4) 38 (7–81) 100 3 (1) 38 (33–81) 100 1 (1) 77 – 3 (1) 8 (7–9) 0 
Touch when purchasing 9 (4) 59 (5–92) 100 
         
LBM = live bird market; n (c) = number of studies along with the number of countries in which these studies took 























Prevalence of preventive practices and practices related to the slaughtering and processing of poultry, and the management of sick and dead poultry 
 
Households Premises Farms Live bird markets 
n (c) p (range) I
2
 n (c) p (range) I
2
 n (c) p (range) I
2
 n (c) p (range) I
2
 
Slaughtering and processing poultry 11 (7) 45 (12–85) 99 
   
2 (2) 22 (6–38) 98 4 (4) 73 (39–100) 98 
Management of sick and dead poultry 
   Touching 9 (3) 33 (14–75) 99 2 (1) 11 (8–13) 86 
   
1 (1) 41 – 
   Consumption 13 (6) 12 (2–100) 99 
      
1 (1) 16 – 
   Selling 7 (6) 26 (0–100) 99 
   
1 (1) 81 – 2 (2) 28 (2–53) 99 
   Returning to suppliers 
   
1 (1) 50 – 
   
1 (1) 9 – 
   Throwing in open spaces 11 (7) 45 (2–87) 99 1 (1) 20 – 
         Burying/Incinerating 13 (8) 72 (2–95) 99 
   
2 (2) 62 (30–95) 99 
   Preventive practices 
   Washing hands with soap after contacts with poultry 6 (4) 97 (4–99) 96 
      
1 (1) 68 – 
   Wearing gloves 3 (3) 2 (1–2) 0 2 (1) 51 (47–54) 81 4 (4) 18 (1–30) 90 1 (1) 60 – 
   Wearing facemask 4 (3) 2 (0–2) 0 2 (1) 44 (42–46) 37 4 (4) 21 (6–66) 98 4 (4) 18 (13–45) 93 
   Wearing aprons/changing clothes 2 (2) 3 (0–5) 0 1 (1) 89 – 3 (3) 4 (3–34) 94 4 (2) 42 (15–80) 96 
   Wearing boots 1 (1) 6 – 
   
3 (3) 15 (7–16) 6 4 (2) 60 (30–80) 92 
   Rinsing/washing equipment after use 2 (2) 66 (33–99) 98 
   
1 (1) 41 – 4 (1) 50 (19–100) 97 
n (c) = number of studies along with the number of countries in which these studies took place in brackets; p (range) = median prevalence (%) and range. 






SUPPLEMENTAL FIGURE 1. Prevalence of practices related to backyard poultry rearing. Premise includes farms, 





SUPPLEMENTAL FIGURE 2. Prevalence of practices related to purchase of poultry in live bird markets. Premise 





SUPPLEMENTAL FIGURE 3. Prevalence of practices related to the slaughtering and processing of poultry. Premise 





SUPPLEMENTAL FIGURE 4. Prevalence of practices related to the management of sick and dead poultry. Premise 











SUPPLEMENTAL TABLE 1 
Assessment of study quality 
Author (year) and study design Confounding Selection of participants Measurement of exposures Missing data Measurement of outcomes Overall 
Mounts (1999) (CC)
8
 Serious Low Moderate Low Low Serious 
Zhou (2009) (CC)
2
 Moderate Low Moderate Low Low Moderate 
Areechokchai (2006) (CC)
11
 Serious Moderate Moderate Low Moderate Serious 
Dinh (2006) (CC)
3
 Moderate Moderate Moderate Low Low Moderate 
Yupiana (2010) (E)
22
 Serious Low Serious Low Serious Serious 
Vong (2009) (CC)
10
 Serious Low Serious Low Moderate Serious 
Bridges (2002) (CC)
9
 Serious Low Moderate Low Moderate Serious 
Cavailler (2010) (CS)
23
 Moderate Low Moderate Low Moderate Moderate 
Huo (2012) (CS)
12
 Serious Low Moderate Low Moderate Serious 
Li (2013) (CS)
24
 Moderate Low Moderate Low Moderate Moderate 
Gomaa (2015) (CS)
16
 Moderate Serious Moderate Low Moderate Serious 
Li (2014) (CC)
4
 Moderate Low Moderate Low Low Moderate 
Liu (2014) (CC)
5
 Moderate Low Moderate Low Low Moderate 
He (2014) (CC)
6
 Moderate Low Moderate Low Moderate Moderate 
Ai (2013) (CC)
7
 Moderate Low Moderate Low Low Moderate 
Yu (2014) (E)
14
 Serious Low Serious Low Serious Serious 
Fang (2013) (E)
25
 Serious Low Serious Low Serious Serious 
Fuller (2014) (E)
26
 Serious Low Serious Low Serious Serious 
Wu (2014) (E)
15
 Serious Low Serious Low Serious Serious 
Wang (2014) (C)
17
 Moderate Moderate Moderate Low Moderate Moderate 
Ahad (2014) (CS)
19
 Moderate Moderate Moderate Low Moderate Moderate 
Yang (2012) (CS)
18
 Moderate Moderate Moderate Low Serious Serious 
Yu (2013) (CS)
13
 Serious Moderate Moderate Low Moderate Serious 
CC = case–control; CS = cross-sectional; E = ecological. Low, moderate, and serious refer to the level of risk of bias. 
 
 
SUPPLEMENTAL TABLE 2 
Sensitivity analysis of risk factor studies according to their overall risk of bias 
Practice Subtype Health status Sub-group n pOR (95% CI) I
2
 
Raising poultry at home H5N1 Healthy/NS 
All studies 3 3 (1.7–5.5) 18 
Moderate bias 2 3.7 (2–6.7) 0 
Serious bias 1 1.4 (0.3–6.4) - 
Raising poultry at home H5N1 Sick/dead 
All studies 3 9.5 (5.1–17.8) 0 
Moderate bias 2 8.4 (4–17.7) 0 
Serious bias 1 13 (1.8–96.3) - 
Raising poultry at home H7N9 Healthy/NS 
All studies 4 3.6 (1.4–8.9) 69 
Moderate bias 4 3.6 (1.4–8.9) 69 
Serious bias 0 – – 
Visiting LBM H7N9 Healthy/NS 
All studies 4 5.2 (3.6–7.3) 0 
Moderate bias 4 5.2 (3.6–7.3) 0 
Serious bias 0 – – 
Poultry husbandry: Cleaning H5N1 Healthy/NS 
All studies 3 1.5 (0.7–3) 35 
Moderate bias 1 0.8 (0.3–2.3) – 
Serious bias 2 2 (0.8–4.7) 26 
Bathing in ponds H5N1 – 
All studies 3 3.1 (1.5–6.4) 5 
Moderate bias 2 2.5 (1.1–5.3) 0 
Serious bias 1 11.3 (1.3–102.2) – 
Using outdoor water source H5N1 – 
All studies 3 2.5 (0.5–12.1) 81 
Moderate bias 2 1.8 (0.3–12.6) 89 
Serious bias 1 6.8 (0.7–66.4) – 
Touching (unspecified practice) H5N1 Healthy/NS 
All studies 5 2.8 (1.1–7.4) 67 
Moderate bias 4 2.5 (0.9–7.5) 73 
Serious bias 1 5.8 (0.9–113.6) – 
Touching (unspecified practice) H5N1 Sick/dead 
All studies 5 4.8 (1.2–19.2) 88 
Moderate bias 3 4.7 (0.9–23.3) 88 
Serious bias 2 4.4 (0.1–195.7) 93 
Touching (unspecified practice) H7N9 Healthy/NS 
All studies 6 5.5 (2.3–13.1) 71 
Moderate bias 6 5.5 (2.3–13.1) 71 
Serious bias 0 – – 
Preparing poultry H5N1 Healthy/NS 
All studies 3 3.3 (1.1–9.5) 77 
Moderate bias 1 2.2 (0.6–10.4) – 
Serious bias 2 4.8 (0.5–45.6) 88 








SUPPLEMENTAL TABLE 3 
Sensitivity analysis of risk factor studies according to their location. 
Practice Subtype Health status Sub-group n pOR (95% CI) I
2
 
Poultry husbandry: cleaning H5N1 Healthy/NS 
All studies 3 1.5 (0.7–3) 35 
Households 2 1.7 (0.3–9.9) 65 
Premises 1 1.6 (0.9–2.7) – 
Touching (unspecified practice) H5N1 Healthy/NS 
All studies 5 2.8 (1.1–7.4) 67 
Households 2 1.4 (0.3–7.6) 85 
Premises 3 5.5 (2.3–13.2) 0 
Touching (unspecified practice) H5N1 Sick/dead 
All studies 5 4.8 (1.2–19.2) 88 
Households 4 5.6 (0.8–39.5) 90 
Premises 1 2.6 (1.3–5.4) – 
Touching (unspecified practice) H7N9 Healthy/NS 
All studies 6 5.5 (2.3–13.1) 71 
Households 4 7.6 (2.8–20.1) 75 
Premises 2 2 (0.4–9.9) 34 
Preparing poultry H5N1 Healthy/NS 
All studies 3 3.3 (1.1–9.5) 77 
Households 2 5.6 (0.8–41.5) 81 
Premises 1 1.7 (1.1–2.7) – 
CI = confidence interval; n = number of studies; NS = not specified; pOR = pooled odds ratio along with its 95% CI. 

















SUPPLEMENTAL TABLE 4 
Sensitivity analysis of practice prevalence studies according to their location 
Practice Setting Subgroups n Range I2 
Raise backyard poultry Urban HHs 
All countries 4 19–51 98 
Lao 2 40–51 81 
Raise backyard poultry Semi-urban HHs 
All countries 3 34–55 91 
Lao 2 51–55 20 
Raise backyard poultry Rural HHs 
All countries 15 50–96 98 
China 3 50–52 0 
Lao 3 64–86 92 
Thailand 3 68–80 74 
Keep poultry inside house HHs 
All countries 6 1–87 100 
Bangladesh 2 27–80 99 
Lao 2 1–3 0 
Touch when purchasing HHs 
All countries 9 5–92 100 
China (HK) 3 5–14 80 
China 3 17–71 100 
Vietnam 2 63–92 99 
Slaughtering and processing poultry HHs 
All countries 11 12–85 99 
Cambodia 3 28–38 93 
China 2 12–45 100 
Thailand 2 19–59 99 
Management of sick and dead poultry 
    Touching HHs 
All countries 9 14–75 99 
Cambodia 5 31–75 99 
Thailand 3 28–39 73 
    Consumption HHs 
All countries 13 2–100 99 
Cambodia 5 14–87 99 
Lao 2 3–5 0 
Thailand 2 2–12 85 
Vietnam 2 5–5 0 
    Selling HHs 
All countries 7 0–100 99 
Lao 2 0–0 0 
    Throwing in open spaces HHs 
All countries 11 2–87 99 
Bangladesh 3 45–87 89 
Lao 2 5–16 93 
Vietnam 2 12–23 90 
    Burying/Incinerating HHs 
All countries 13 2–95 99 
Bangladesh 3 2–12 10 
Egypt 2 16–19 0 
Lao 2 78–87 90 
Vietnam 2 76–79 26 
Preventive practices 
    Handwashing HHs 
All countries 6 4–99 96 
Thailand 2 80–99 94 
Vietnam 2 96–99 0 
    Wearing facemask HHs 
All countries 4 0–2 0 
Thailand 2 2–2 0 
    Wearing aprons/changing clothes LBMs 
All countries 4 15–80 96 
Indonesia 3 15–55 81 
    Wearing boots LBMs 
All countries 4 30–80 92 
Indonesia 3 30–65 79 
HHs = households; HK = Hong Kong; LBMs = live bird markets. Handwashing: washing hands with soap after 
contacts with poultry. The ranges of practice prevalence and I2 indices are presented for studies conducted within 
the same countries. 
 
SUPPLEMENTAL TABLE 5 
Sensitivity analysis of practice prevalence studies according to their quality score 
Practice Setting Subgroup n Range I2 
Raise backyard poultry Urban HHs 
All countries 4 19–51 98 
Quality 1 3 19–51 98 
Quality 2 1 51 – 
Raise backyard poultry Semi-urban HHs 
All countries 3 34–55 91 
Quality 1 3 34–55 91 
Quality 2 0 – – 
Raise backyard poultry Rural HHs 
All countries 15 50–96 98 
Quality 1 6 52–90 98.1 
Quality 2 9 50–96 97.9 
Keep poultry inside house HHs 
All countries 6 1–87 100 
Quality 1 4 1–87 100 
Quality 2 2 14–80 99 
Visit LBMs Urban HHs 
All countries 3 33–81 99.8 
Quality 1 1 81 – 
Quality 2 2 33–38 91.2 
Visit LBMs Semi-urban HHs 
All countries 1 77 – 
Quality 1 1 77 – 
Quality 2    
Visit LBMs Rural HHs 
All countries 3 7–9 0 
Quality 1 3 7–9 0 
Quality 2    
Touch when purchasing HHs 
All countries 9 5–92 100 
Quality 1 7 5–92 99.7 
Quality 2 2 17–71 99.8 
Slaughtering and processing poultry HHs 
All countries 11 12–85 99 
Quality 1 9 19–85 99.4 
Quality 2 2 12–85 99.6 
Management of sick and dead poultry 
    Touching HHs 
All countries 9 14–75 99 
Quality 1 5 14–75 99.4 
Quality 2 4 28–39 64.6 
    Consumption HHs 
All countries 13 2–100 99 
Quality 1 6 2–45 98.5 
Quality 2 7 2–100 99.4 
    Selling HHs 
All countries 7 0–100 99 
Quality 1 4 0–26 95.7 
Quality 2 3 72–100 83.1 
    Throwing in open spaces HHs 
All countries 11 2–87 99 
Quality 1 6 2–45 97.9 
Quality 2 5 48–87 87.8 
    Burying/Incinerating HHs 
All countries 13 2–95 99 
Quality 1 6 2–95 99.4 
Quality 2 7 10–76 98 
Preventive practices 
    Handwashing HHs 
All countries 6 4–99 96 
Quality 1 1 80 – 
Quality 2 5 4–99 96.3 
    Wearing gloves HHs 
All countries 3 1–2 0 
Quality 1 0 – – 
Quality 2 3 1–2 0 
    Wearing facemask HHs 
All countries 4 0–2 0 
Quality 1 1 2 – 
Quality 2 3 0–2 0 
    Wearing aprons/changing clothes HHs 
All countries 2 0–5 0 
Quality 1 0 – – 
Quality 2 2 0–5 0 
    Wearing boots HHs 
All countries 1 6 – 
Quality 1 0 – – 
Quality 2 1 6 – 
    Rinsing/washing equipment HHs 
All countries 2 33–99 97.7 
Quality 1 0 – – 
Quality 2 2 33–99 97.7 
HHs = households; LBMs = live bird markets. Handwashing: washing hands with soap after contacts with poultry. 
The ranges of practice prevalence and I2 indices are presented for studies from the same quality group. 
 
SUPPLEMENTAL TABLE 6 
Risky practices of which their association with AIV infection was assessed in ecological studies 
Exposure Measure of association (95% CI) Author (year) 
Poultry density (1,000/km
2
) RR = 1 (0.8–1.1), P = 0.59 Yupiana (2010) 
The number of poultry outbreaks RR = 1.3 (1.1–1.7), P = 0.02 Yupiana (2010) 
LBM density 
BRT weight > 5 Fang (2013) 
OR = 1.1 (1–1.1), P < 0.001 Fuller (2014) 
LBM closure 
Reduction in daily incidence 
    Shanghai: 99% (93–100%)  
    Hangzhou: 99% (92–100%)  
    Huzhou: 97% (68–100%)  
    Nanjing: 97% (81–100%) Yu (2014) 
Reduction in daily incidence 
    Overall estimate: 97% (89–100%) Wu (2014) 




















SUPPLEMENTAL TABLE 7 
Additional variables assessing the association between AIV infection and proximity between poultry and humans, size of susceptible poultry populations, 
frequency of exposure, and premise type 
Exposure category Exposure Subtype Non-adj OR (95% CI) Adj OR (95% CI) Author (year) 
Raising poultry at home: cages inside/outside the house 
Poultry cages inside the house vs. no poultry H5N1 9.7 (1.8–53.3)  Zhou (2009) 
Poultry cages outside the house vs. no poultry H5N1 3.7(0.9–15.3)  Zhou (2009) 
Raising poultry at home: vaccinated flocks 
Poultry H5 vaccination coverage < 80% vs. no poultry H5N1 7.1 (1.6–31.6)  Zhou (2009) 
Poultry H5 vaccination coverage > 80% vs. no poultry H5N1 4.0 (0.9–17.9)  Zhou (2009) 
Waterfowl H5 vaccination coverage < 80% vs. no waterfowl H5N1 8.4 (1.6–45.1)  Zhou (2009) 
Waterfowl H5 vaccination coverage > 80% vs. no waterfowl H5N1 2.4 (0.5–11.2)  Zhou (2009) 
Raising poultry at home: flock size Poultry number H5N1 2.4(1–5.7)  Huo (2012) 
Working with poultry: flock size Number of poultry bred > 1,000 H5N1  3.8 (1.7–8.7) Li (2013) 
Visiting LBM: visit frequency 
1–5 visits within 2 weeks before illness vs. no visits H5N1 2.8 (0.9–8.1)  Zhou (2009) 
6–10 visits within 2 weeks before illness vs. no visits H5N1 7.6 (1.1–53.7)  Zhou (2009) 
> 10 visits within 2 weeks before illness vs. no visits H5N1 5.8 (1.2–28.6)  Zhou (2009) 
1–9 visits vs. no visits H7N9 3.4 (1.2–9.3) 3.8 (1.3–10.8) Li (2014) 
> 10 visits vs. no visits H7N9 5.6 (1.2–26.9) 10.6 (1.9–60.7) Li (2014) 
1–5 visits vs. no visits H7N9 1.5 (0.4–5.5)  Ai (2013) 
6–9 visits vs. no visits H7N9 0.8 (0.1–7.4)  Ai (2013) 
> 10 visits vs. no visits H7N9 8.8 (2.2–35.1)  Ai (2013) 
Working with poultry: premise type 
Farm type: layer vs. broiler H7  0.8 (0.3–2.5) Ahad (2014) 
Farm type: breeder vs. broiler H7  3.8 (1.4–10.1) Ahad (2014) 
Farm type: layer vs. broiler duck H9 6.4 (1.7–23.6)  Yang (2012) 
Work in retail vs. wholesale/farm/other premises H5N1 2.7 (1.5–4.9)  Bridges (2002) 
Working with poultry: type of activity Chicken butcher vs. chicken keeper H9 3.4 (0.8–14.5)  Yu (2013) 
Poultry species 
Raise chickens only (no waterfowls) H5N1 2.6 (0.6–12.1)  Zhou (2009) 
Raise waterfowl H5N1 6.4 (1.6–26.3)  Zhou (2009) 
Exposed to geese H5N1 3.6 (1.2–10.2) 3.1 (0.9–10.4) Gomaa (2015) 
Exposed to turkeys H5N1 3.8 (1.3–11.3) 2.7 (0.8–9.5) Gomaa (2015) 
Exposed to ducks H9 4.7 (1.1–19.7) 5.7 (1.3–25.2) Gomaa (2015) 
Duck keeper vs. chicken keeper H9 1.1 (0.3–4)  Yu (2013) 
adj OR = odds ratios adjusted for other exposures, along with 95% confidence interval; CI = confidence interval; LBM = live bird market; non-adj OR = odds 
ratios non-adjusted for other exposures, along with 95% confidence interval. 
 
 
SUPPLEMENTAL TABLE 8 
Characteristics of studies exploring the prevalence of poultry exposure practices 
Reference Country Year Study population n Sampling Data Study level Q 
Leslie (2008)
27
 Afghanistan 2007 Residents 304 prob. quest. National 1 
Vong (2006)
28
 Cambodia 2005 Residents 155 non-prob. quest. District 2 
Liao (2009)
29
 China 2006 Residents 1550 prob. quest. Province 1 
Wang (2014)
30
 China 2013 Residents 3731 non-prob. quest. National 2 
Radwan (2011)
31
 Egypt 2011 Residents 150 non-prob. quest. District 2 
Santhia (2009)
32
 Indonesia 2005 Residents 291 prob. quest. Province 1 
Barennes (2010)
33
 Lao 2007 Residents 1098 prob. quest. National 1 
Wilson (2007)
34
 Lao 2007 Residents ns non-prob. quest. National 2 
Maton (2007)
35
 Thailand 2005 Residents 784 prob. quest. Province 1 
Somrongthong (2012)
36
 Thailand 2008 Residents 968 non-prob. quest. Province 2 
Edirne (2011)
37
 Turkey 2007–2008 Residents 1046 prob. quest. Province 1 
Rimi (2014)
38
 Bangladesh 2009 Residents 252 non-prob. obs./int. District 2 
Cavailler (2010)
23
 Cambodia 2007 Residents 700 non-prob. quest. District 2 
Peng (2014)
39
 China 2007 Residents 4950 prob. quest. District 2 
Gai (2008)
40
 China 2007–2008 Residents 1379 prob. quest. National 1 
Fielding (2005)
41
 China (HK) 2004 Residents 986 prob. quest. National 1 
Fielding (2007)
42
 China (HK) 2005–2006 Residents 1760 prob. quest. National 1 
Fielding (2014)
43
 China (HK) 2010 Residents 461 prob. quest. National 1 
Barennes (2007)
44
 Lao 2006 Residents 461 prob. quest. National 1 
Olsen (2005)
45
 Thailand 2004 Residents 200 prob. quest. District 2 
Dejpichai (2009)
46
 Thailand 2005 Residents 131 non-prob. quest. National 2 
Liao (2014)
47
 Thailand 2006 Residents 907 prob. quest. Province 1 
Fielding (2007)
42
 Vietnam 2005–2006 Residents 1988 prob. quest. National 1 
Liao (2014)
47
 Vietnam 2006 Residents 994 prob. quest. National 1 
Manabe (2011)
48
 Vietnam 2009 Residents 418 prob. quest. District 2 
Manabe (2012)
49
 Vietnam 2011 Residents 322 prob. quest. District 2 
Sultana (2012a)
50
 Bangladesh 2008 Res. with birds 106 non-prob. obs./int. District 2 
Sultana (2012b)
51
 Bangladesh 2008 Resident with birds 40 non-prob. obs./int. District 2 
Khan (2012)
52
 Bangladesh 2011 Resident with birds 300 prob. quest. National 1 
Ly (2007)
53
 Cambodia 2006 Resident with birds 269 prob. quest. National 1 
Van Kerkhove (2009)
54
 Cambodia 2006 Resident with birds 452 prob. quest. National 1 
Van Kerkhove (2008)
55
 Cambodia 2007 Resident with birds 3600 prob. quest. National 1 
Van Kerkhove (2009)
54
 Cambodia 2007 Resident with birds 800 prob. quest. National 1 
Khun (2012)
56
 Cambodia 2009 Resident with birds 246 prob. quest. District 2 
Negro-Calduch (2013)
57
 Egypt 2009–2010 Resident with birds 102 non-prob. quest. Province 2 
Kayali (2011)
58
 Lebanon 2010 Resident with birds 200 non-prob. quest. National 2 
Nasreen (2013)
59
 Bangladesh 2009 Farm workers 212 non-prob. quest. National 2 
Yu (2013)
13
 China 2009–2010 Farm workers 305 non-prob. quest. Province 2 
Negro-Calduch (2013)
57
 Egypt 2009–2010 Farm workers 124 non-prob. quest. Province 2 
Robert (2010) Indonesia 2007 Farm workers 495 non-prob. quest. District 2 
Neupane (2012) Nepal 2009 Farm workers 96 prob. quest. District 2 
Sarker (2011) Bangladesh 2008–2009 Market workers 318 non-prob. quest. District 2 
Ma (2014) China 2013 Market workers 306 prob. quest. Province 1 
Kumar (2013) India 2008 Market workers 207 non-prob. quest. District 2 
Santhia (2009) Indonesia 2005 Market workers 87 non-prob. quest. District 2 
Samaan (2012)
65
 Indonesia 2008 Market workers 34 non-prob. quest. District 2 
Samaan (2011)
66
 Indonesia 2010 Market workers 37 non-prob. quest. District 2 
Sutanto (2013)
52
 Indonesia 2012 Market workers 100 prob. quest. District 2 
Kuo (2011)
67
 Taiwan 2009–2010 Market workers 177 non-prob. quest. District 2 
Li (2013)
24
 China 2010–2012 Poultry workers 1169 non-prob. quest. Province 2 
Yang (2012)
18
 China 2011 Poultry workers 1741 prob. quest. Province 1 
HK = Hong Kong; obs./int. = observations and/or in-depth interviews; Q = quality grade; quest.: standardized questionnaires. National: several provinces are 
included in the study; district: the study was conducted at the level of a district, or below. Sampling refers to the sampling strategy, probabilistic (prob.) or non-







SUPPLEMENTAL TABLE 9 
Prevalence of poultry exposure practices 
Practice/country Population/year n p CI Author (year) 
Bury/incinerate dead birds/ Household/     
Bangladesh  40 12 4–27 Sultana (2012b) 
Bangladesh 2009 30 10 2–27 Rimi (2014) 
Bangladesh 2011 300 2 1–4 Khan (2012) 
Cambodia 2009 246 72 65–77 Khun (2012) 
China 2007 127 38 29–47 Peng (2014) 
Egypt 2009–2010 102 19 12–28 Negro-Calduch (2013) 
Egypt 2011 127 16 10–23 Radwan (2011) 
Indonesia 2005 291 80 75–85 Santhia (2009) 
Lao 2006 399 78 73–82 Barennes (2007) 
Lao 2007 1098 87 85–89 Barennes (2010) 
Thailand 2006 907 95 93–96 Liao (2014) 
Vietnam 2006 994 79 76–81 Liao (2014) 
Vietnam 2009 418 76 71–80 Manabe (2011) 
Bury/incinerate dead birds/ Farm/     
Egypt 2009–2010 124 30 22–39 Negro-Calduch (2013) 
Nepal 2009 96 95 88–98 Neupane (2012) 
Consuming dead birds/ Household/     
Bangladesh 2008 40 100 91–100 Sultana (2012b) 
Cambodia 2006 269 45 39–51 Ly (2007) 
Cambodia 2006 452 45 40–50 Van Kerkhove (2009) 
Cambodia 2007 700 56 52–60 Cavailler (2010) 
Cambodia 2007 800 14 11–16 Van Kerkhove (2009) 
Cambodia 2009 246 87 83–91 Khun (2012) 
China 2007 127 3 1–8 Peng (2014) 
Lao 2006 399 2 1–5 Barennes (2007) 
Lao 2007 1098 5 4–6 Barennes (2010) 
Thailand 2004 200 12 8–17 Olsen (2005) 
Thailand 2008 968 2 1–3 Somrongthong (2012) 
Vietnam 2005–2006 253 5 3–9 Fielding (2007) 
Vietnam 2009 418 5 3–8 Manabe (2011) 
Consuming dead birds/ Market/     
Bangladesh 2008–2009 318 16 12–21 Sarker (2011) 
Keep poultry inside house/ Household/     
Bangladesh 2008 106 80 71–87 Sultana (2012a) 
Bangladesh 2011 300 27 22–32 Khan (2012) 
Cambodia 2007 2401 87 85–88 Van Kerkhove (2008) 
Egypt 2011 118 14 8–21 Radwan (2011) 
Lao 2006 428 3 1–5 Barennes (2007) 
Lao 2007 1098 1 0–1 Barennes (2010) 
Raise backyard poultry/ Household/     
Turkey 2007–2008 1046 66 63–69 Erdine (2011) 
Vietnam 2005–2006 1988 53 51–55 Fielding (2007) 
Raise backyard poultry/ Peri-urban household/     
Lao 2006 192 50 43–58 Barennes (2007) 
Lao 2007 364 55 50–61 Barennes (2010) 
 
 
Raise backyard poultry/ Rural household/     
Afghanistan 2007 304 65 59–70 Leslie (2008) 
Bangladesh 2009 252 81 76–86 Rimi (2014) 
Cambodia 2005 155 96 92–99 Vong (2006) 
China 2007 1043 51 48–54 Peng (2014) 
China 2007–2008 1379 52 49–54 Gai (2008) 
China 2013 1227 50 47–53 Wang (2014) 
Egypt 2011 150 78 71–84 Radwan (2011) 
Indonesia 2005 291 90 86–93 Santhia (2009) 
Lao 2006 189 84 78–89 Barennes (2007) 
Lao 2007 570 64 60–68 Barennes (2010) 
Lao 2007 NA 88 85–90 Wilson (2007) 
Thailand 2004 200 74 67–80 Olsen (2005) 
Thailand 2005 131 68 59–76 Dejpichai (2009) 
Thailand 2005 784 80 77–83 Maton (2007) 
Vietnam 2011 322 92 89–95 Manabe (2012) 
Raise backyard poultry/ Peri-urban household/     
China 2006 187 34 27–42 Liao (2009) 
Raise backyard poultry/ Urban household/     
China 2006 1363 19 17–21 Liao (2009) 
Lao 2006 461 40 36–45 Barennes (2007) 
Lao 2007 164 51 43–58 Barennes (2010) 
Vietnam 2011 221 51 44–57 Manabe (2012) 
Return sick birds to supplier/ Market/     
Bangladesh 2008–2009 318 9 6–13 Sarker (2011) 
Return sick birds to supplier/ LBM/farm worker/     
India 2008 207 50 43–57 Kumar (2013) 
Rinse/wash equipment/ Household/     
Bangladesh 2009 30 33 17–53 Rimi (2014) 
Egypt 2011 127 99 96–100 Radwan (2011) 
Rinse/wash equipment/ Farm/     
Nepal 2009 96 41 31–51 Neupane (2012) 
Rinse/wash equipment/ Market/     
Indonesia 2008 34 38 22–56 Samaan (2012) 
Indonesia 2009 29 62 42–79 Samaan (2012) 
Indonesia 2010 37 19 8–35 Samaan (2011) 
Indonesia 2012 100 100 96–100 Sutanto (2013) 
Sell sick/dead poultry/ Household/     
Afghanistan 2007 304 26 22–32 Leslie (2008) 
Bangladesh 2008 40 100 91–100 Sultana (2012b) 
Cambodia 2009 246 89 85–93 Khun (2012) 
Egypt 2009–2010 102 72 63–81 Negro-Calduch (2013) 
Lao 2006 399 0 0–1 Barennes (2007) 
Lao 2007 1098 0 0–1 Barennes (2010) 
Vietnam 2005–2006 253 5 3–9 Fielding (2007) 
Sell sick/dead poultry/ Farm/     
Egypt 2009–2010 124 81 73–87 Negro-Calduch (2013) 
Sell sick/dead poultry Market/     
Bangladesh 2008–2009 318 53 48–59 Sarker (2011) 
India 2008 105 2 0–7 Kumar (2013) 
Slaughter poultry/ Farm/     
Bangladesh 2009 212 38 32–45 Nasreen (2013) 
Indonesia 2007 495 6 4–9 Robert (2010) 
Slaughter poultry/ Household/     
Bangladesh 2011 300 84 80–88 Khan (2012) 
Cambodia 2006 452 38 34–43 Van Kerkhove (2009) 
Cambodia 2007 3600 28 27–30 Van Kerkhove (2008) 
Cambodia 2007 800 36 32–39 Van Kerkhove (2009) 
China 2006 1550 45 42–47 Liao (2009) 
China 2013 685 12 9–14 Wang (2014) 
Egypt 2011 150 85 78–90 Radwan (2011) 
Indonesia 2005 841 55 52–58 Santhia (2009) 
Thailand 2005 147 19 13–26 Maton (2007) 
Thailand 2006 907 59 56–62 Liao (2014) 
Vietnam 2006 994 85 83–87 Liao (2014) 
Slaughter poultry/ Market/     
Bangladesh 2009 210 39 32–46 Nasreen (2013) 
China 2013 306 87 83–91 Ma (2014) 
India 2008 105 100 97–100 Kumar (2013) 
Indonesia 2005 87 58 46–68 Santhia (2009) 
Throw dead birds/ Household/     
Bangladesh 2008 40 48 32–64 Sultana (2012b) 
Bangladesh 2009 30 87 69–96 Rimi (2014) 
Bangladesh 2011 300 45 40–51 Khan (2012) 
Cambodia 2009 246 75 69–80 Khun (2012) 
China 2007 127 57 48–65 Peng (2014) 
Egypt 2011 127 84 77–90 Radwan (2011) 
Lao 2006 399 16 13–20 Barennes (2007) 
Lao 2007 1098 5 3–6 Barennes (2010) 
Thailand 2006 907 2 1–3 Liao (2014) 
Vietnam 2005–2006 253 12 8–16 Fielding (2007) 
Vietnam 2006 994 23 20–26 Liao (2014) 
Throw dead birds/ LBM/Farm worker/     
India 2008 207 20 15–26 Kumar (2013) 
Touch dead/sick poultry/ Household/     
Cambodia 2006 269 75 69–80 Ly (2007) 
Cambodia 2006 452 75 71–79 Van Kerkhove (2009) 
Cambodia 2007 700 31 28–35 Cavailler (2010) 
Cambodia 2007 3600 33 31–34 Van Kerkhove (2008) 
Cambodia 2007 800 42 39–46 Van Kerkhove (2009) 
Thailand 2004 200 39 32–46 Olsen (2005) 
Thailand 2005 131 28 21–37 Dejpichai (2009) 
Touch dead/sick poultry/ Farm/     
China 2011 1741 13 12–15 Yang (2012) 
Touch dead/sick poultry/ Market/     
Indonesia 2005 87 41 31–52 Santhia (2009) 
Touch dead/sick poultry/ Poultry workers/     
China 2010–2012 1169 8 7–10 Li (2013) 
Touch dead/sick poultry/ Rural household/     
Indonesia 2005 841 14 12–17 Santhia (2009) 







Touch when purchasing/ Household/     
China 2006 1550 59 56–61 Liao (2009) 
China 2007 2058 17 15–19 Peng (2014) 
China 2013 685 71 67–74 Wang (2014) 
China (HK) 2004 774 14 12–17 Fielding (2005) 
China (HK) 2005–2006 1191 8 6–9 Fielding (2007) 
China (HK) 2010 189 5 2–9 Fielding (2014) 
Thailand 2006 907 63 60–66 Liao (2014) 
Vietnam 2005–2006 676 63 59–67 Fielding (2007) 
Vietnam 2006 994 92 90–94 Liao (2014) 
Visit LBMs/ Household/     
China (HK) 2004 986 78 76–81 Fielding (2005) 
China (HK) 2005–2006 1760 71 69–73 Fielding (2007) 
China (HK) 2010 461 41 36–46 Fielding (2014) 
Vietnam 2005–2006 1988 34 32–36 Fielding (2007) 
Visit LBMs/ Rural household/     
Cambodia 2006 452 9 7–12 Van Kerkhove (2009) 
Cambodia 2007 3600 7 6–8 Van Kerkhove (2008) 
Cambodia 2007 800 8 6–10 Van Kerkhove (2009) 
Visit LBMs/ Peri-urban household/     
China 2006 187 77 70–83 Liao (2009) 
Visit LBMs/ Urban household/     
China 2006 1363 81 79–83 Liao (2009) 
China 2007 2058 38 36–40 Peng (2014) 
China 2013 2504 33 31–35 Wang (2014) 
Wash hands with soap/ Household/     
Bangladesh 2009 30 4 0–17 Rimi (2014) 
Egypt 2011 118 98 94–100 Radwan (2011) 
Thailand 2005 147 80 73–86 Maton (2007) 
Thailand 2008 691 99 98–100 Somrongthong (2012) 
Vietnam 2009 418 96 94–98 Manabe (2011) 
Vietnam 2011 322 99 97–100 Manabe (2012) 
Wash hands with soap/ Market/     
Bangladesh 2008–2009 318 68 63–73 Sarker (2011) 
Wear aprons/change clothes/ Household/     
Egypt 2011 118 5 2–11 Radwan (2011) 
Lebanon 2010 128 0 0–3 Kayali (2011) 
Wear aprons/change clothes/ Farm/     
Bangladesh 2009 212 34 28–41 Nasreen (2013) 
Lebanon 2010 72 4 1–12 Kayali (2011) 
Nepal 2009 96 3 1–9 Neupane (2012) 
China 2009–2010 305 89 85–92 Yu (2013) 
Wear aprons/change clothes/ Market/     
China 2013 306 80 75–84 Ma (2014) 
Indonesia 2008 34 15 5–31 Samaan (2012) 
Indonesia 2009 29 55 36–74 Samaan (2012) 
Indonesia 2010 37 30 16–47 Samaan (2011) 
Wear boots/ Household/ 128 6 3–12 Kayali (2011) 
Lebanon 2010     
Wear boots/ Farm/     
Bangladesh 2009 212 16 11–22 Nasreen (2013) 
Lebanon 2010 72 15 8–26 Kayali (2011) 
Nepal 2009 96 7 3–14 Neupane (2012) 
Wear boots/ Market/     
China 2013 306 80 75–84 Ma (2014) 
Indonesia 2008 34 65 46–80 Samaan (2012) 
Indonesia 2009 29 55 36–74 Samaan (2012) 
Indonesia 2010 37 30 16–47 Samaan (2011) 
Wear facemask/ Household/     
Egypt 2011 127 2 0–6 Radwan (2011) 
Lebanon 2010 128 0 0–3 Kayali (2011) 
Thailand 2005 147 2 0–6 Maton (2007) 
Thailand 2008 691 2 1–3 Somrongthong (2012) 
Wear facemask/ Farm/     
Bangladesh 2009 212 66 59–72 Nasreen (2013) 
Indonesia 2007 495 14 11–18 Robert (2010) 
Lebanon 2010 72 6 2–14 Kayali (2011) 
Nepal 2009 96 27 19–37 Neupane (2012) 
China 2009–2010 305 46 40–52 Yu (2013) 
China 2011 1741 42 40–44 Yang (2012) 
Wear facemask/ Market/     
Bangladesh 2008–2009 318 17 13–21 Sarker (2011) 
China 2013 306 20 16–25 Ma (2014) 
Indonesia 2012 100 13 7–21 Sutanto (2013) 
Taiwan 2009–2010 177 45 38–53 Kuo (2011) 
Wear gloves/ Household/     
Egypt 2011 127 2 0–6 Radwan (2011) 
Lebanon 2010 128 2 0–6 Kayali (2011) 
Thailand 2008 691 1 0–2 Somrongthong (2012) 
Wear gloves/ Farm/     
Bangladesh 2009 212 27 21–33 Nasreen (2013) 
Indonesia 2007 495 10 8–13 Robert (2010) 
Lebanon 2010 72 1 0–7 Kayali (2011) 
Nepal 2009 96 30 21–40 Neupane (2012) 
China 2009–2010 305 54 48–60 Yu (2013) 
China 2011 1741 47 45–49 Yang (2012) 
Wear gloves/ Market/     
China 2013 306 60 54–66 Ma (2014) 
CI = confidence interval; HK = Hong Kong; LBM = live bird market; n = sample size; p = proportion of respondents 
adopting the practice. Wash hands with soap: handwashing after contacts with poultry; throw dead birds: throw dead 








SUPPLEMENTAL TABLE 10 
Identified rationales by authors based on responses to interviews and observation for poultry exposure practices in 
reviewed practice prevalence studies 
Practice Summary of rationale Setting Country Author (year) 
To keep poultry inside 
the bedroom 
They are concerned about the security of their poultry. They want 
to protect them from jungle cats, foxes, and thieves. 
HH Bangladesh Sultana (2012) 
To keep sick poultry 
inside the bedroom 
Sick poultry are kept under a basket in the yard during the daytime 
to separate them from their healthy poultry, and under the bed at 
night to observe if the poultry were about to die. 
HH Bangladesh Sultana (2012b) 
To consume sick 
poultry 
They slaughter and consume the sick poultry if they thought that 
the poultry would not recover because Islam prohibits eating 
animals that die of natural causes 
HH Bangladesh Sultana (2012b) 
Unable to sell sick poultry, they consume them, in accordance with 
the Islamic principles. They slaughter their healthy poultry in fear 
of losing them, when hearing about high mortality in neighboring 
flocks 
HH Bangladesh Rimi (2014) 
Cleaning ground after 
slaughter 
First because they want to avoid disease among poultry, second 
because blood looks bad, and third because stepping on blood 
might cause harm to others, pregnant women in particular 
HH Bangladesh Rimi (2014) 
Buying live poultry Traditional habit, lower meat quality of chilled or frozen meat Market China Ma (2014) 
Risky practices 
These practices are traditional. Traditional practices are explained 
as a matter of preference. 
HH Turkey Erdine (2011) 
They relate to the perception that people and poultry are not at risk. 
Most people were aware of avian influenza, but estimated the risks 
associated with poultry handling to be negligible. 
Market Lao Barennes (2007) 
No preventive practices 
Farmers cannot afford their implementation HH Lao Barennes (2010) 
Lack of willingness, economic dependence on limited resources, 
and low living standards. 
HH Turkey Erdine (2011) 
Villagers do not believe that AIVs can transmit to humans. They 
consider the chance of an adverse outcome from poultry exposure 
to be quite low compared with the adverse outcome of worse 
poverty, and are therefore less likely to change their behavior to 
decrease the frequency of poultry–human interactions. 
HH Bangladesh Sultana (2012) 
Absence of supporting legislation, financial constraints, time, and 
space constraints 
HH/Farm Egypt Negro-Calduch (2013) 
Fear of losing costumers, may reduce sales, may increase costs. Market Indonesia Sutanto (2013) 












SUPPLEMENTAL TABLE 11 
Examples of rationales discussed as post hoc hypotheses by authors of practice prevalence and risk factor studies 
Practice Summary of rationale Setting Country Author (year) 
Buying live poultry 
They prefer live poultry to pre-killed for family consumption. Poultry 
slaughtered immediately before cooking are traditionally believed to be 
fresher, better in flavor, more nutritious and less likely to be 
contaminated 
HH Vietnam Liao (2014) 
Hygiene measures in 
markets/preventive 
measures 
Resistance due to ―risk fatigue‖ from repeated wet market-related 
outbreaks combined with economic concerns. Effective preventive 
measures would threaten economic security among traders with low 
education and few employment alternatives 
Market China Ma (2014) 
Rear backyard 
poultry 
Poultry prices have increased, making poultry consumption a privilege 
of the wealthier Vietnamese. This encourages the continuation of 
backyard farming 
HH Vietnam Liao (2014) 
Consumption of sick 
and dead birds 
Poultry prices have increased, making poultry consumption a privilege 
of the wealthier Vietnamese. This encourages the continuation of 
backyard farming, including the full use of sick/dead birds 
HH Vietnam Liao (2014) 
Slaughtering poultry 
According to Buddhist principles, killing is considered to have karmic 
consequences. Thai people are therefore less likely to slaughter the 
poultry themselves 
HH Thailand Liao (2014) 
Touching poultry 
before purchase 
The reason for touching and feeling the poultry before buying relates 
to the consumer tradition, relying on their own judgment on the quality 
and safety of the poultry 
HH Vietnam/Thailand Liao (2014) 
Risky practices 
Farmers’ inadequate knowledge, awareness, and information about 
zoonosis 
HH Bangladesh Khan (2012) 
People have believed that people could never get infected with HPAI 
by engaging in risky practices. The study notes that this may be 
strongly related to poverty and illiteracy 
HH Cambodia Khun (2012) 













SUPPLEMENTAL TABLE 12 
Risky and protective practices of which their association with AIV infection was assessed in the reviewed risk factor studies 
Exposure H. L. Non-adj OR (95% CI) Adj OR (95% CI) Author (year) 
Poultry in the vicinity: neighbors raising poultry 
 Live poultry in neighborhood NS  1.1 (0.2–6.6), P = 0.81  Dinh (2006) 
Poultry in the vicinity: poultry farms in the vicinity 
 Poultry farms in the vicinity NS  13 (2.4–133) 42 (2.3–1000) He (2014) 
Poultry in the vicinity: neighbors raising poultry 
 Neighbors raising poultry at home NS  6.4 (2.9–15)  He (2014) 
 Raising poultry or pigeons in the neighborhood NS  0.9 (0.4–2.2), P = 0.82  Li (2014) 
 Sick or dead poultry in the neighborhood Sick  3.9 (1.0–55.7), P = 0.05  Dinh (2006) 
In location with poultry: attending cockfight 
Attended cockfight NS  1.5 (0.3–5.5), P = 0.47  Cavailler (2010) 
In location with poultry: visiting LBM, neighbors raising poultry 
 Visiting markets, and poultry raised in the neighborhood NS  6.9 (1.9–25.2), P = 0.003 4.2 (0.9–19.6), P = 0.064 Ai (2013) 
In location with poultry 
 In location with poultry NS  2.3 (1.0–5.3), P = 0.06  Liu (2014) 
In location with poultry: raising poultry at home 
 Raise poultry NS H 0.7 (0.1–6.7), P = 0.75  Ai (2013) 
 Being < 1 m away from dead poultry Sick H 13 (1.8–96.3)  Areechokchai (2006) 
 Live poultry in household NS H 3 (0.9–10), P = 0.1  Dinh (2006) 
 Sick or dead poultry in household Sick H 7.4 (2.7–59), P < 0.001 4.9 (1.2–20.2), P = 0.03 Dinh (2006) 
 Raising poultry at home NS H 9 (2.6–39)  He (2014) 
 Indirect contact with poultry at home NS H 4.4 (1.1–18.2), P 0.04  Li (2014) 
 Exposure to backyard poultry at home (raise) NS H 2.4 (1.1–5.6), P = 0.04 1.5 (0.5–4.4), P = 0.48 Liu (2014) 
 Sick or dying backyard poultry in month before symptoms Sick H 9.4 (2.5–36.1), P < 0.01 9.8 (2.2–43.2) P < 0.01 Liu (2014) 
 Live birds in home NS H 1.4 (0.3–6.4), P < 0.9  Mounts (1999) 
 Raise backyard poultry NS H 4.5 (1.1–17.5) P = 0.03  Zhou (2009) 
 Indirect contact with sick and/or dead poultry Sick NS 11.3 (2.2–58.5), P = 0.004 57 (4.3–746), P = 0.002 Zhou (2009) 
Raising poultry at home: cages inside the house 
 Poultry cages inside the house vs. no poultry NS H 9.7 (1.8–53.3) P = 0.009  Zhou (2009) 
Raising poultry at home: cages outside the house 
 Poultry cages outside the house vs. no poultry NS H 3.7 (0.9–15.3) P = 0.07  Zhou (2009) 
Raising poultry at home: vaccinated flocks 
 Poultry H5 vaccination coverage < 80% vs. no poultry NS H 7.1 (1.6–31.6), P = 0.01  Zhou (2009) 
 Poultry H5 vaccination coverage > 80% vs. no poultry NS H 4.0 (0.9–17.9), P = 0.07  Zhou (2009) 
 Waterfowl H5 vaccination coverage < 80% vs. no waterfowl NS H 8.4 (1.6–45.1), P = 0.01  Zhou (2009) 
 Waterfowl H5 vaccination coverage > 80% vs. no waterfowl NS H 2.4 (0.5–11.2), P = 0.26  Zhou (2009) 
 
 
Raising poultry at home: flock size 
 Poultry number NS H 2.4 (1–5.7), P = 0.03  Huo (2012) 
In location with poultry: Poultry species 
 Raise chickens only (no waterfowls) NS H 2.6 (0.6–12.1)  Zhou (2009) 
 Raise waterfowl NS H 6.4 (1.6–26.3)  Zhou (2009) 
 Exposed to geese NS NS 3.6 (1.2–10.2) 3.1 (0.9–10.4) Gomaa (2015) 
 Exposed to turkeys NS NS 3.8 (1.3–11.3) 2.7 (0.8–9.5) Gomaa (2015) 
 Exposed to ducks NS NS 4.7 (1.1–19.7) 5.7 (1.3–25.2) Gomaa (2015) 
 Duck keeper vs. chicken keeper NS F 1.1 (0.3–4)  Yu (2013) 
In location with poultry: working on a poultry premise 
 Occupational poultry exposure NS P 13.1 (1.4–125.4), P = 0.03  Zhou (2009) 
 > 10% Mortality among poultry Sick P 2.2 (1.3–3.7)  Bridges (2002) 
 Occurrence of sick/dead ducks at worksite Sick F 1.1 (0.2–4.9), P = 0.94  Yang (2012) 
Working with poultry: premise type 
 Farm type: layer vs. broiler NS F  0.8 (0.3–2.5) Ahad (2014) 
 Farm type: breeder vs. broiler NS F  3.8 (1.4–10.1) Ahad (2014) 
 Farm type: layer vs. broiler duck NS F 6.4 (1.7–23.6), P = 0.006  Yang (2012) 
 Work in retail vs. wholesale/farm/other poultry industry NS M 2.7 (1.5–4.9)  Bridges (2002) 
Working with poultry: flock size 
 Number of poultry bred > 1,000 NS P  3.8 (1.7–8.7), P = 0.001 Li (2013) 
In location with poultry: visiting LBM 
 Visiting a wet poultry market NS M 3.1 (1.2–7.9), P = 0.02 15.4 (3.0–80.2), P = 0.001 Zhou (2009) 
 Visiting a wet poultry market (computed) NS M 3.8 (1.5–9.8)  Li (2014) 
 Visit LBM NS M 10.4 (4.9–22.0), P < 0.01 3.4 (1.8–6.7), P < 0.01 Liu (2014) 
 Purchasing of live or freshly slaughtered poultry in a market NS M 7.9 (3–23) 4.9 (1.2–24) He (2014) 
 Visited LBM NS M 3.1 (1.1–8.3), P = 0.03  Ai (2013) 
 Exposure to poultry in market NS M 4.5 (1.2–21.7), P = 0.05  Mounts (1999) 
In location with poultry: visiting informal LBM 
 Visiting a temporary roadside poultry vendor NS M 7 (1.2–40.6), P = 0.03  Li (2014) 
Visiting LBM: visit frequency 
 1–5 visits within 2 weeks before illness vs. no visits NS M 2.8 (0.9–8.1), P = 0.06  Zhou (2009) 
 6–10 visits within 2 weeks before illness vs. no visits NS M 7.6 (1.1–53.7), P = 0.04  Zhou (2009) 
 > 10 visits within 2 weeks before illness vs. no visits NS M 5.8 (1.2–28.6), P = 0.03  Zhou (2009) 
 Visiting a live poultry market: 1–9 times vs. no NS M 3.4 (1.2–9.3), P = 0.02 3.8 (1.3–10.8), P = 0.01 Li (2014) 
 Visiting a live poultry market: > 10 times vs. no NS M 5.6 (1.2–26.9), P = 0.03 10.6 (1.9–60.7), P = 0.008 Li (2014) 
 Market: 1–5 visits vs. no visits NS M 1.5 (0.4–5.5), P = 0.55  Ai (2013) 
 Market: 6–9 visits vs. no visits NS M 0.8 (0.1–7.4), P = 0.82  Ai (2013) 
 Market: > 10 visits vs. no visits NS M 8.8 (2.2–35.1), P = 0.002  Ai (2013) 
Poultry husbandry: cleaning 
 Removed/cleaned feces from poultry areas NS H 5 (0.7–36.3), P = 0.09  Vong (2009) 
 Cleaning poultry stalls (job duty) NS P 1.6 (0.9–2.7)  Bridges (2002) 
 Cleaning henhouse NS M 2.6 (0.8–8), P = 0.1  Wang (2014) 
 Cleaned poultry stalls NS H 0.8 (0.3–2.3), P = 0.71  Cavailler (2010) 
Poultry husbandry: collecting eggs 
 Touched/collected eggs NS H 2.5 (0.2–26), P = 0.44  Vong (2009) 
 Collecting eggs (job duty) NS P 1.2 (0.6–2.2)  Bridges (2002) 
Poultry husbandry: feeding 
 Fed poultry NS H 0.6 (0–19.5), P = 0.64  Vong (2009) 
 Feeding poultry (job duty) NS P 2.4 (1.4–4.1)  Bridges (2002) 
 Feeding NS M 1.8 (0.3–10), P = 0.53  Wang (2014) 
Selling poultry: handling money 
 Handling money (job duty) NS P 1.6 (1.0–2.5)  Bridges (2002) 
Processing, preparing poultry: helped/witnessed 
 Helped prepare or cook sick or dead poultry Sick H 2.6 (0.8–8.7), P = 0.1  Dinh (2006) 
 Witnessed poultry slaughtering at market NS M 5 (1.7–14.9), P = 0.004  Zhou (2009) 
Processing, preparing poultry: storing poultry products 
 Storing products of sick or dead poultry in house Sick H 9.3 (2.1–41.3)  Areechokchai (2006) 
Bathing in pond 
 Swim/bathe in ponds NS H 11.3 (1.3–102.2), P = 0.03  Vong (2009) 
 Swam/bathed in pond NS H 2.5 (1–6.5), P = 0.05 3 (1.1–8.4), P = 0.04 Cavailler (2010) 
 Wading in ponds NS H 2.4 (0.4–19.2), P = 0.47  Dinh (2006) 
Using outdoor water sources 
 Use pond as source of water NS H 6.8 (0.7–66.4), P = 0.08  Vong (2009) 
 No indoor water source (use outdoor sources) NS H 5 (1.3–77), P = 0.01 6.5 (1.2–34.8), P = 0.03 Dinh (2006) 
 Lack of indoor water supply NS H 0.7 (0.1–4.3), P = 0.73  Zhou (2009) 
Touching (unspecified practice) 
 Direct contact with poultry NS NS 13.7 (2.9–64.8), P < 0.001 9.1 (1.6–50.9), P = 0.012 Ai (2013) 
 Direct touching of unexpectedly dead poultry Sick H 29 (2.7–308)  Areechokchai (2006) 
 Touching poultry (job duty) NS P 5.8 (0.9–113.6)  Bridges (2002) 
 Touched/fed live poultry NS H 0.6 (0.2–1.6), P = 0.34  Cavailler (2010) 
 Touched sick poultry Sick H 1.4 (0.6–3.8), P = 0.46  Cavailler (2010) 
 Tending to home-raised poultry NS H 19 (4–182) 9.9 (0.4–318) He (2014) 
 Direct or close contact with poultry NS P 5.9 (1.8–19), P < 0.001 5.2 (1.5–17.7), P = 0.008 Li (2013) 
 Direct or close contact with sick/dead poultry Sick P 2.6 (1.3–5.4), P < 0.02  Li (2013) 
 Occupational direct contact with poultry NS P 6.4 (0.6–74.2), P = 0.14  Li (2014) 
 Raising poultry or pigeons at home (direct contact) NS H 3.2 (0.6–17.2), P = 0.16  Li (2014) 
 Touching live poultry with bare hands in a market NS M 1.1 (0.6–2.2), P = 0.74  Li (2014) 
 Poultry contact (feeding, capturing, cleaning, etc.) NS NS 3.6 (1.7–7.3), P < 0.01  Liu (2014) 
 Touched sick and/or dead poultry with bare hands Sick H 0.6 (0.1–4.5), P = 0.61  Vong (2009) 
 Handling ducks with wounds on hands NS F 6.3 (2–20.1), P = 0.002 4.1 (1.3–13.6), P = 0.02 Yang (2012) 
 Close contact with sick/dead ducks Sick F 0.6 (0.1–4.6), P = 0.61  Yang (2012) 
 Direct contact with healthy-appearing poultry H NS 3.3 (1.0–10.4), P = 0.04  Zhou (2009) 
 Direct contact with live poultry at the market NS M 4.6 (0.4–51.9), P = 0.22  Zhou (2009) 
 Direct contact with sick and/or dead poultry Sick NS 34.7 (4.3–277), P < 0.001 507 (16–16320), P < 0.001 Zhou (2009) 
Direct contacts: butchers vs. keepers 
 Occupational exposure: butchers vs. keepers NS P 3.4 (0.8–14.5), P = 0.09  Yu (2013) 
Contact with poultry from home vs. markets 
 Indirect or direct contact with poultry (backyard or from markets) at home NS H 3.9 (2–7.5), P < 0.01  Liu (2014) 
 Indirect or direct contact at home only with backyard poultry NS H 1.2 (0.6–2.5), P = 0.56  Liu (2014) 
 Indirect or direct contact at home with poultry traded in markets NS H 6.3 (2.9–13.7), P < 0.01  Liu (2014) 
Processing, preparing poultry: slaughtering 
 Butchering poultry (job duty) NS P 3.1 (1.6–5.9)  Bridges (2002) 
 Chopped/butchered sick poultry Sick H 1.6 (0.6–4.6), P = 0.37  Cavailler (2010) 
 Poultry contact during slaughtering or processing NS NS 3.1 (1.7–5.9), P < 0.01  Liu (2014) 
 Slaughtered and/or bled poultry NS H 2.5 (0.3–10.8), P = 0.45  Vong (2009) 
 Processing NS M 0.9 (0.3–2.4), P = 0.85  Wang (2014) 
Processing, preparing poultry: plucking 
 Plucking poultry NS H 14 (1.3–153)  Areechokchai (2006) 
 Plucked sick poultry Sick H 1.7 (0.6–4.8), P = 0.33  Cavailler (2010) 
 Defeathered poultry that died of illness Sick H 3.1 (0.3–34.9), P = 0.35  Vong (2009) 
Processing, preparing poultry: eviscerating 
 Touching poultry intestines (job duty) NS P 1.7 (0.9–2.9)  Bridges (2002) 
 Eviscerated sick poultry Sick H 1.2 (0.4–3.6), P = 0.77  Cavailler (2010) 
 Removed internal organs NS H 1.5 (0.3–8.7), P = 0.64  Vong (2009) 
Processing, preparing poultry: preparing 
 Prepared and cooked poultry or birds at home NS H 8.1 (2.1–31.7), P = 0.003  Ai (2013) 
 Dressing poultry NS H 17 (1.6–177)  Areechokchai (2006) 
 Preparing poultry for restaurants (job duty) NS P 1.7 (1.1–2.7)  Bridges (2002) 
 Cooked sick poultry Sick H 1.2 (0.4–3.6), P = 0.78  Cavailler (2010) 
 Prepared and cooked sick or dead poultry Sick H 31 (3.4–1150), P < 0.001 9 (1–82), P = 0.05 Dinh (2006) 
 Prepared and cooked healthy poultry H H 2.2 (0.6–10.4), P = 0.25  Dinh (2006) 
 Preparing or cooking at home NS H 1.4 (0.4–5), P = 0.61  Li (2014) 
Processing, preparing poultry: washing carcass/meat      
 Washed sick poultry carcasses Sick H 1.3 (0.5–3.8), P = 0.59  Cavailler (2010) 
 Cut/wash internal meat NS H 2.0 (0.27–14.9), P = 0.49  Vong (2009) 
Consumption 
 Consumed healthy-appearing poultry H NS 1.3 (0.4–4.2), P = 0.61  Zhou (2009) 
 Consumed poultry organs or poultry NS NS 0.6 (0.0–7.5), P = 1  Mounts (1999) 
 Poultry consumption NS NS 1.2 (0.7–2.0), P = 0.52 0.7 (0.4–1.4), P = 0.28 Liu (2014) 
 Ate sick poultry Sick H 1.3 (0.5–3.3), P = 0.64  Cavailler (2010) 
Poultry husbandry: gathering, placing in cages 
 Gathered poultry and placed in cages/poultry areas NS H 5.8 (1–34.1), P = 0.05  Vong (2009) 
Poultry husbandry: transporting 
 Transportation of poultry NS M 2.2 (0.4–12.1), P = 0.35  Wang (2014) 
Poultry husbandry: vaccinating 
 Vaccinate poultry NS NS 2.4 (1.2–4.8), P = 0.009 2.4 (1.1–5) Gomaa (2015) 
Poultry husbandry: selling 
 Selling poultry NS M 0.7 (0.3–2), P = 0.55  Wang (2014) 
 
Frequent handwashing 
 Frequent handwashing  H 0.1 (0–0.6), P = 0.008  Ai (2013) 
 Handwashing > 3 times/day  H 0.5 (0.1–2.4), P = 0.57  Dinh (2006) 
 Infrequent (or no) handwashing at home  H 1.8 (0.6–6.1), P = 0.32  Li (2014) 
 Washed hands with soap after handling poultry  H 0.4 (0–3.9), P = 0.4  Vong (2009) 
Wearing gloves 
 Do not use gloves  F 2.7 (0.7–9.9), P = 0.14  Yang (2012) 
Wearing masks 
 Do not use mask  F 8.1 (1–62.6), P = 0.05  Yang (2012) 
Poor hygiene conditions 
 Poor hygiene conditions  H 1 (0.3–3.4), P = 0.83  Dinh (2006) 
Frequent disinfection of worksite 
 Frequency of worksite disinfection: < twice monthly  F 7.5 (1.6–34.2), P = 0.01 5.1 (1.1–24.6), P = 0.04 Yang (2012) 
Cleaning knife after preparing poultry 
 Household uses soap to clean  H 0.3 (0.1–1), P = 0.06  Mounts (1999) 
Ecological study: markets 
 Number of LBMs NS   BRT weight > 5 Fang (2013) 
 LBM density NS   1.1 (1–1.1), P < 0.001 Fuller (2014) 
 LBM closure NS M  Red. in daily incidence Yu (2014) 
 LBM closure NS M  Red. in daily incidence Wu (2014) 
Ecological study: poultry density 
 Poultry density (1,000/km2) NS   RR = 1 (0.8–1.1), P = 0.59 Yupiana (2010) 
Ecological study: outbreaks in poultry 
 The number of poultry outbreaks Sick   RR = 1.3 (1.1–1.7), P = 0.02 Yupiana (2010) 
BRT = boosted regression tree; CI = confidence interval; LBM = live bird market; RR = risk relative. ―H.‖ refers to the health status of poultry (H: healthy; NS: 
not specified; sick: sick or dead poultry); ―L.‖ refers to the location where exposure (NS: not specified, H: households, M: markets, F: farms, P: premises, 
including markets, farms, and abattoirs); non-adj OR: odds ratios non-adjusted for other exposures, along with 95% confidence interval and P value; adj OR: 
odds ratios adjusted for other exposures, along with 95% confidence interval and P value; If other measures of association than odds ratios are assessed, they are 
mentioned in the table. 
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